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Abstract:  
 
This paper presents estimates of the impact of public R&D on patenting activity at the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Using a time series of public sector agency data, we 
estimate the per-capita R&D elasticity of new patent applications using a knowledge production 
function framework model that is an expanded version of what other scholars have used with 
private sector data. New patent applications are an important step in the technology transfer 
activities of a federal agency. We estimate this elasticity to be about 2.0. This elasticity value 
represents an initial estimate of the impact of EPA’s R&D investments on its technology transfer 
activity. 
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Article:  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Productivity growth began to decline throughout the U.S. industrial sector in the early 1970s, and 
that decline became more pronounced in the late 1970s (Link and Siegel 2003; Leyden and Link 
2015). There were a number of policy responses to this productivity slowdown, and the seeds for 
several of them were set forth in President Jimmy Carter’s 1979 Domestic Policy Review (Carter 
1979). Among areas of emphasis was the transfer of federally funded technology to the private 
sector: 
 
Often, the information that underlies a technological advance is not known to companies 
capable of commercially developing that advance. I am therefore taking several actions to 
ease and encourage the flow of technical knowledge and information. These actions 
include establishing the Center for the Utilization of Federal Technology at the National 
Technical Information Service to improve the transfer of knowledge from Federal 
laboratories; and, through the State and Commerce Departments, increasing the 
availability of technical information developed in foreign countries. 
 
The U.S. Congress responded to this charge in several ways. In October 1980, Congress passed 
the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-480). This act states 
that Congress finds and declares: 
 
Technology and industrial innovation are central to the economic, environmental, and 
social well-being of citizens of the United States. Technology and industrial innovation 
offer an improved standard of living, increased public and private sector productivity, 
creation of new industries and employment opportunities, improved public services and 
enhanced competitiveness of United States products in world markets. Many new 
discoveries and advances in science occur in universities and Federal laboratories, while 
the application of this new knowledge to commercial and useful public purposes depends 
largely upon actions by business and labor. Cooperation among academia, Federal 
laboratories, labor, and industry, in such forms as technology transfer, personnel 
exchange, joint research projects, and others, should be renewed, expanded, and 
strengthened. … It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to ensure 
the full use of the results of the Nation’s Federal investment in research and development. 
To this end the Federal Government shall strive where appropriate to transfer federally 
owned or originated technology to State and local governments and to the private sector. 
 
To enhance the technology transfer mission of federal laboratories, Congress amended the 
Stevenson-Wydler Act in October 1986 with the passage of the Federal Technology Transfer Act 
(FTTA) of 1986 (Public Law 99-502). This new act also established the Federal Laboratory 
Consortium (FLC) for Technology Transfer, and the National Bureau of Standards, which later 
became the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), acted as the host agency for 
the FLC. The FTTA provides an additional incentive for federal agency scientists and 
researchers to be proactive in the identification and transfer of their technologies by requiring 
that royalties and income received from the licensing of patented technologies be retained by the 
federal agency and shared with its inventor(s). Finally, the FTTA facilitated technology transfer 
by permitting the agencies to enter into cooperative research and development agreements 
(CRADAs) with public and private organizations.1 
 Technology transfer from federal agencies and their laboratories has traditionally been a 
bipartisan issue in the United States. Recently, President Barack Obama issued, on October 28, 
2011, ‘Presidential Memorandum: Accelerating Technology Transfer and Commercialization of 
Federal Research in Support of High-Growth Businesses’ (Obama 2011). The President’s 
Memorandum specifically emphasized the relationship between technology transfer, innovation, 
and economic growth: 
  
Innovation fuels economic growth, the creation of new industries, companies, jobs, 
products and services, and the global competitiveness of U.S. industries. One driver of 
successful innovation is technology transfer, in which the private sector adapts Federal 
research for use in the marketplace. … I direct that [Federal laboratories] establish goals 
and measure performance, streamline administrative processes, and facilitate local and 
regional partnerships in order to accelerate technology transfer and support private sector 
commercialization. 
 
Technology transfer from federal agencies is also a point of emphasis for President Donald 
Trump. In the spirit of public accountability, the Trump Administration pointed out (Trump, 
Undated, 48):2 
 
The Federal Government invests approximately $150 billion annually in research and 
development (R&D) conducted at Federal laboratories, universities, and other research 
organizations. For America to maintain its position as the leader in global innovation, 
bring products to market more quickly, grow the economy, and maintain a strong national 
security innovation base, it is essential to optimize technology transfer and support 
programs to increase the return on investment (ROI) from federally funded R&D. 
 
Traditionally defined technology transfer from federal agencies has focused on patents, licenses, 
and CRADAs. Surprisingly, there are few academic studies that examine any of these 
dimensions of technology transfer from federal agencies. The few that do are summarized in 
Section 2. We suggest that a reason for this paucity of scholarship is that access to technology 
transfer data from federal agencies, much less from their research laboratories, is limited. 
 Some scholars have studied the R&D-to-patenting relationship using private sector firm 
data (discussed below), but little is known about the economic impact of publicly funded R&D 
on public sector patenting activity. The absence of such information is one factor that motivated 
NIST and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to sponsor recently the 
Unleashing American Innovation initiative.3 
 In this paper, we build on the framework used by scholars who have studied the R&D-to-
patenting relationship among private sector firms to focus on patenting activity at the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Patenting activity at the EPA, and its developed 
technologies, have not been widely studied. But, in an era of global environmental emphasis, a 
study of EPA-developed technology and its transfer to the private sector will likely be of broad-
based interest and importance because of the subject matter associated with EPA research. 
 For context, we briefly discuss the history of the EPA in Section 3. Ours is not a paper 
related specifically to public sector support of environmental research; rather, it is a paper 
illustrating the estimation of a public sector knowledge production function that uses an EPA set 
of data as we discuss below. 
 In Section 4, we present and discuss available time series data on several technology 
transfer metrics from the EPA. Our discussion of technology transfer metrics from EPA, albeit a 
single agency, represents to the best of our knowledge the first research effort to illustrate a 
detailed time pattern in such metrics. Our choice to illustrate the estimation of a public sector 
knowledge production function with EPA data is motivatived by the relative length of the time 
series of information available from EPA and by the inclusion of information on new invention 
disclosures, which are a necessary first step within a firm or federal agency for a new patent 
application. 
 In Section 5, we analyze these EPA data econometrically with an eye toward quantifying 
aspects of the patenting impacts traceable to EPA’s R&D investments. Our econometric 
specification of a knowledge production function framework is more complete than the model 
used by other researchers who examined the R&D-to-patent application relationship within a 
knowledge production framework among private sector firms. Our ability to expand the 
knowledge production function framework to include new invention disclosures is due to the 
richness of the EPA data. We find empirically that the per-capita R&D elasticity of new patent 
applications is about 2.0. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6 with summary remarks and 
a discussion of the implication of our elasticity estimate as well as possible future research 
related to technology transfer from federal agencies/laboratories. 
 
2. Academic literature on technology transfer 
 
 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a series of articles began to bring together fragmented 
and disaggregated datasets related to federal agency technology transfer activities. These studies 
were limited to specific agencies that were willing to share information with researchers, as our 
review of the U.S. federal agency/laboratory technology transfer literature below illustrates. 
Thus, our paper is arguably one of the more complete analyses of technology transfer through 
patent applications from a federal agency/laboratory. 
 Regarding the literature, Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks (1998) and Jaffe and Lerner (2001) 
undertook a significant data collection effort for their empirical study of patenting behavior at 
NASA and the Department of Energy (DOE). Their two papers concluded that the federal policy 
changes in the 1980s were followed by increased patenting activity in both agencies. Jaffe and 
Lerner (2001) found that as a result of this increase, federal laboratories reached parity with 
universities in terms of patents per R&D dollar without an overall decline in patent quality. 
Using NASA data, Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks (1998) established that patent citations are a 
reasonable, but still noisy, measure of technology spillovers. Furthermore, geographic proximity 
between a firm and the laboratory increases knowledge spillovers as measured by citations. 
 Link, Siegel, and Van Fleet (2011) is a longitudinal study of overall patenting activity at 
two federal laboratories: NIST and Sandia National Laboratories (combined). The authors 
examined the trend in patenting in these laboratories in response to the Stevenson-Wydler Act 
and the Federal Technology Transfer Act, and they inferred from the time series that the latter 
act had the greater impact on increasing patenting activity. 
 Stevens et al. (2011) employed a novel approach for exploring the social value of 
intramural research that had been transferred to private-sector partners. Specifically, they 
investigated the degree to which successful drug discovery and development projects were 
derived from public-sector research. These authors did not identify the mechanism through 
which public sector research was transferred to the private sector, but given that they attributed 
technology to public sector research institutions based on patents, it is likely that the method of 
transfer was a license negotiated between the public sector and the firm. They found that medical 
technologies derived from public sector research (likely through licenses) are expected to have a 
significant therapeutic effect; more than half are used in treating cancer or infectious diseases. 
 Finally, Chen, Link, and Oliver (2018) used data on CRADA activity at NIST to explore 
several research questions: Did the Federal Technology Transfer Act have an impact on CRADA 
activity at NIST? Is CRADA activity at NIST a cyclical phenomenon? And, at what frequency 
do private sector establishments engage in CRADA activity with NIST? The authors characterize 
this last research question as an exploratory test of the relationship between firm size and the 
propensity to engage in a CRADA. The authors found suggestive evidence that the FTTA began 
to influence NIST’s CRADA activity within two to three years after its passage, and that 
CRADA activity moves with the business cycle. The authors also found that most establishments 
that were engaged in CRADA activity were engaged only once; only the larger establishments 
continued to engage over time in CRADAs with NIST.4 
 The extant literature, as summarized above, is limited in its scope of emphasis and level 
of analysis on technology transfer metrics arguably due to limitations on relevant data. We 
contribute to the literature by overcoming these shortcoming by not only investigating a time 
series of data on patent activity from one U.S. agency, the EPA, but also by acknowledging 
conceptually and empirically the role of invention disclosures in the patenting process. 
 
3. A brief history of the EPA 
 
 The establishment of the EPA resulted from the conflux of a number of events that 
affected society. These events included the widespread use of pesticides as the U.S. agrarian 
economy grew in the post-World War II period, which contributed to the degradation of the 
environment. Emissions from industrial manufacturing growth and the increase in use of 
automobiles were polluting the air. Destructive chemicals and toxic nuclear waste were being 
dumped daily into lakes, streams, and rivers; discarded pesticides used to produce America’s 
food were killing wildlife and becoming imbedded in the food chain. 
 Historically, state and local governments had jurisdiction for environmental protection; 
however, most states did little to protect the environment. Many individuals and businesses, 
through their ignorance, believed the environment was an inexhaustible resource that could be 
exploited without repercussion (Andrews 2011). Some observers contend that the publication of 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 was the inspiration that planted the seed for the national 
environmental movement that began that year and extended into the 1970s (EPA 2018). Carson, 
an avid birdwatcher, was concerned that the continued heavy use of pesticides would kill all the 
birds and with no birds to sing, every spring would become silent. She also connected this 
likelihood to the results of the defoliation tactics used by the United States in the Vietnam War 
(Andrews 2011). Citizens became alarmed at the possibility of hidden poisons coming from the 
environment they once saw as being indestructible. The American people began to realize that 
there are repercussions to the mistreatment of the environment, and the media played an 
important role in keeping the public up-to-date on the latest environmental disasters. 
 President Richard Nixon’s administration perceived that an emphasis on environmental 
issues would provide an opportunity to draw attention away from the unpopular Vietnam War. In 
December 1969, he appointed a White House committee lead by Mr. Roy Ash, known as the Ash 
Council, to determine whether a separate environmental institution should be established. At the 
same time, Congress sent the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, Public Law 91-190) to 
President Nixon for his signature. The purposes of NEPA are: 
 
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony 
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate 
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to 
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the 
Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality. 
 
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was created to advise the President on 
environmental matters and to review Environmental Impact Statements submitted by all federal 
agencies planning projects with major environmental impact (Lewis 1985). 
 President Nixon signed NEPA into law on New Year’s Day 1970. During this event, he 
declared the 1970s to be the decade of the environment. Later that month, President Nixon 
emphasized environmental issues in his State of the Union address. He then submitted to 
Congress in February of that year a 37-point environmental action plan giving special emphasis 
to strengthening federal programs to clean-up air and water pollution (Lewis 1985). 
 In April 1970, the public’s concern for the environment culminated with the first Earth 
Day celebration, the largest demonstrations since the celebration of the victory to end World War 
II (EPA 2018). A week later, the Ash Council submitted its report and recommendations to the 
President. The report strongly favored an independent agency to coordinate the administration’s 
environmental efforts. The council favored an independent agency because it would not require 
Congressional approval and could be established through a Presidential Reorganization Plan to 
consolidate existing executive programs into one new agency. The new agency would absorb the 
CEQ and have the same mission but with an additional responsibility to establish and enforce 
environmental standards. 
 After President Nixon issued Reorganization Plan No. 3 in July 1970, which officially 
established the EPA on December 2, 1970, he chose his Assistant Attorney General, William D. 
Ruckelshaus, as the EPA’s first Administrator. 
 The EPA began as a so-called holding company housing existing programs from other 
executive departments and agencies with no legislative power to set policies among the various 
programs. Bipartisan Congressional acts gave teeth to the new agency by giving it a mandate and 
powers to reduce air, water, and land pollution and to protect the public from harmful pesticides 
and other manmade chemicals (EPA 2018). 
 Several pieces of legislation directly involved the EPA and thus elevated its national 
visibility. Two of these legislations include the Clean Air Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-604),5 
which has the purpose of, among other things, protecting the Nation’s air resources to promote 
the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population; and the Clean Water 
Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-500),6 which has the objective of restoring and maintaining the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.7 
 
4. Technology transfer data from the EPA 
 
 As we noted in Section 1, The Federal Technology Transfer Act required that the FLC 
report to the President and to Congress the technology transfer efforts of federal agencies. 
President Ronald Reagan’s April 10, 1987 Executive Order 12591 formalized this reporting. 
Since 1987, the then Office of Technology Policy within the Technology Administration of the 
Department of Commerce submitted to Congress biannual reports as required. Currently, these 
reports are prepared annually and submitted to the President and to Congress through the 
Technology Partnership Office at NIST.8 
 Each report contains an agency’s self-reported examples of successful technology 
transfers. EPA also publicizes it patented technologies that are available for licensing. Several 
such technologies are briefly described in Table 1. The point of these descriptions is not to 
emphasize the environmental nature of our analysis. On the contrary. Our use of an EPA set of 
data is motivated by its richness to illustrate an estimate of a public sector knowledge production 
function. The descriptions in Table 1, much like the information in Section 3, are intended to 
provide context for understanding the nature of the data. 
 
Table 1. Examples of EPA technology available for licensing.  
 
 
Source: http://www2.epa.gov/ftta 
 
The technology transfer data analyzed in this paper come from the annual reports prepared by the 
Technology Partnership Office.9 Figure 1 shows EPA’s new invention disclosures10 and new 
patent applications by year for fiscal years (FY) 1987 through 2015. Figure 2 shows EPA’s R&D 
expenditures and the total number of EPA employees over the same time period. 
 
 
Figure 1. EPA invention disclosures and new patent applications, FY 1978- FY 2015. Source: 
https://www.nist.gov/tpo/federal-laboratory-interagency-technology-transfer-summary-reports 
 
 
Figure 2. EPA employees and R&D expenditures, FY 1978- FY 2015. Sources: 
https://www.aaas.org/page.historical-trends-federal-rd#Agency; 
https://epa.gov/planandbudget/budget 
 
From Figure 1, new patent applications have been declining since the turn of the century, with an 
increase in that decline beginning prior to the Great Recession. Disclosures have generally 
followed that same pattern with the exception of a spike in FY 2011 and FY 2012. Figure 2 
shows that the decline in R&D expenditures is similar to the decline in new patent applications, 
with a slight decline in employment coming somewhat later. 
 
5. EPA’s knowledge production function: empirical estimates 
 
There is a rich literature that has examined the R&D-to-patenting relationship among private 
sector firms. As mentioned above, we rely on the knowledge production function framework 
from this literature to examine the R&D-to-patenting relationship at the EPA. To the best of our 
knowledge, ours is the first paper to estimate a knowledge production function using public 
sector data. 
 Much of the literature related to patenting in private sector firms was recently reviewed 
by Hall and Harhoff (2012). A portion of that literature is generally referenced as being under the 
rubric of an estimation of a knowledge production function (Griliches 1979). The logic is that 
R&D is an investment into the creation of new knowledge, and within an organization the 
amount of new knowledge can be measured in terms of the number of new patent applications.11 
 The general form for an estimable knowledge production function is, following Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) and Czarnitzki, Kraft, and Thorwarth (2009): 
 
                                                             (1) 
 
 
where PatApp is the count of new patent applications, A is a constant or disembodied shift 
factor, RD represents R&D investments, L represent the number of employees, and α and β 
measure the contribution of each input to the production of patent applications. However, there is 
a second independent variable that affects new patents that previous scholars have omitted from 
their analyses, namely new invention disclosures. In fact, new invention disclosures are a 
necessary first step within a firm or federal agency for a new patent application. Thus, we expand 
equation (1) to be: 
 
                                                            (2) 
 
Equation (2) can be rewritten in two ways. Taking the natural logarithm in equation (2) yields: 
 
       (3) 
 
Alternatively, equation (2) itself can be rewritten as: 
 
       (4) 
 
Not only do equations (3) and (4) represent a framework for the first inquiry into the estimation 
of a public sector knowledge production function, our use of EPA data allows us to expand the 
specification of the model in equation (2) to include new invention disclosures, D.12 
 Equation (3) can be estimated by an OLS regression, using those observations for which 
the logarithms are well-defined. Equation (4) can be estimated by a Poisson or negative 
binominal regression. These regression models conform to the relevant literature on knowledge 
production functions.13 The results from estimating equations (3) and (4), using the data from 
which Figures 1 and 2 were prepared, are reported in Tables 2 through 4. 
 The regression results in column (1) of each table are from a specification using 
contemporaneous values of the independent variables. Disclosures are a significant covariate 
with new patent applications in the Poisson and negative binominal models, but not in the linear 
model. The regression results in column (2) of each table explore the predictive power of a one-
year lag of the independent variables. Uniformly, the R&D and disclosure variables are 
significant. The estimated coefficients on log (RD/L)t-1 measure the per-capita R&D elasticity 
of new patent applications. From the linear model, a 10 percent increase in per-capita R&D in 
the previous year is associated with a 23.5 percent increase in new patent applications in the 
current year. The estimated elasticities from the Poisson and negative binominal models are 
slightly lower. 
 According to the estimated coefficients of log (D/L)t-1, a 10 percent increase in per-
capita disclosures of new inventions in the previous year is associated with a 3.9 to 4.1 percent 
increase in the number of new patent applications. Comparing the values of the adjusted R-
squared (Table 1) and the log-likelihood (Tables 2 and 3) between the first and second columns, 
it is clear that lagged values of R&D per-capita and disclosures per-capita are much better 
predictors than contemporaneous values, in terms of model fit. The regression results in column 
(3) of each table include both contemporaneous and one-year lagged independent variables to 
account for the time needed to engage in research. Again, the one-year lagged R&D and 
disclosure variables are significant, and the magnitude of the per-capita R&D elasticities is 
slightly larger compared to the estimates in columns (2). While the model fit improves when 
both contemporaneous and lagged explanatory variables are included, the estimated coefficients 
of contemporaneous R&D per-capita are all insignificant. 
 
Table 2. OLS regression estimates from equation (3).  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.  
† Two-sidedp-values for the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The test is a Lagrange 
multiplier test described in Godfrey (1988). 
 
 
Table 3. Poisson regression estimates from equation (4). 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.  
† Two-sidedp-values for the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The test is a Lagrange 
multiplier test described in White (1992) 
 
 
 
Table 4. Negative binominal regression estimates from equation (4).  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.  
† Two-sidedp-values for the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The test is a Lagrange 
multiplier test described in White (1992) 
 
Because our data are time series, we also investigate the possibility of autocorrelation in the 
regression errors. In linear models, autocorrelation adversely affects the efficiency of an OLS 
estimator whereas in nonlinear models, such as the Poisson and negative binomial regressions, it 
leads to biased estimates. In the linear specifications, we used the least squares residuals and 
calculated a Lagrange multiplier statistic to the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation.14 For the 
nonlinear specifications, we used a modification of this test, described in White (1992). Tables 2 
through 4 show the p-values of these tests under the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. With 
a minimum p-value of 0.30, none of our model specifications provide evidence of the presence 
of autocorrelation in the errors. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 This paper presents estimates of the impact of R&D on patent applications in one U.S. 
federal agency derived from what is arguably the first estimation of a public sector knowledge 
production function. Our findings, using rich time series data from the EPA on new invention 
disclosures as well as new patent applications, are that R&D matters, and the magnitude of how 
much it matters is estimated in terms of a per-capita R&D elasticity of new patent applications. 
Our estimates are that at the EPA a 10 percent increase in (one-year lagged) R&D is associated 
with an increase in new patent applications of more than 20 percent. 
 Reflecting on the Trump Administration’s call for return on investment estimates to 
federal R&D in, for example, federal agencies and their laboratories, perhaps our effort to 
calculate a per-capita R&D elasticity at the EPA is a first step in that direction. Being the first 
estimate of a public sector knowledge production function, there are no benchmark elasticities 
for comparison.15 Still, our estimate of the per-capital R&D elasticity should not be generalized 
to other U.S. federal agencies because it comes from only EPA technology transfer data. It does, 
however, provide a meaningful point estimate which might encourage additional research related 
to other agencies. 
 In addition to addressing the policy issue of a return on investment to R&D in federal 
agencies and their laboratories, this paper expands codified knowledge about technology transfer 
from federal agencies (albeit that we have analyzed only one agency) by addressing the role of 
invention disclosures as precursors to patent applications. Invention disclosures are an area that 
commands additional investigation. 
 Although others who have estimated the R&D-to-patenting relationship among private 
sector firms have measured patenting in terms of new patent applications, it is important to point 
out, especially with an eye toward a future research agenda, that an increase in new patent 
applications is not in itself a measure of the economic impact of transferred technology from a 
federal agency, but it definitely is an early indication of it. An increase in new patent applications 
might lead to an increase in patents granted, an increase in patents granted might lead to an 
increase in licensing activity, and an increase in licensing activity might lead to broad economic 
impacts associated with transferred technologies from the EPA and from other federal agencies. 
As more data on technology transfer metrics from federal agencies become available, and efforts 
toward this goal were directly called for in the Obama Presidential Memorandum in 2011 and 
were indirectly called for in the recent Trump President’s Management Agenda, more 
comprehensive estimates of the economic impact of federal investment in R&D through licensed 
technologies could be constructed. 
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Notes 
 
1. As stated in the FTTA, a CRADA is 
 
“any agreement between one or more Federal laboratories and one or more non-Federal 
parties under which the Government, through its laboratories, provides personnel, 
services, facilities, equipment, or other resources with or without reimbursement (but not 
funds to non-Federal parties) and the non-Federal parties provide funds, personnel, 
services, facilities, equipment, or other resources toward the conduct of specified research 
or development efforts which are consistent with the missions of the laboratory … ” 
2. A public effort to assess the economic contributions of federal R&D is certainly not new. 
See, for example, the National Academies (2011). 
3. See, https://www.nist.gov/tpo/return-investment-roi-initiative/unleashing-american-
innovation-symposium. 
4. The relevant literature on CRADAs is summarized in Chen, Link, and Oliver (2018). 
5. The technical name of this Act is the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. 
6. The technical name of this Act is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972. 
7. Other legislations include the Environmental Quality Improvement Act (1970), the Ocean 
Dumping Act (1972), the Coastal Zone Management Act (1972), the Marine Protection 
Research and Sanctuaries Act (1972), the Endangered Species Act (1973), the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (1972), the Deepwater Ports and Waterways Safety Act (1974), 
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (1974), the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1976), 
the Water Resources Planning Act (1977), the Water Resources Research Act (1977), and 
the Environmental Education Act of 1990 (Wisman 1985). 
8. The source for the Technology Partnership Office reports is each agency’s report, all of 
which are now, under the Technology Transfer Commercialization Act of 2000 (Public 
Law 106-404), prepared annually. 
9. See, https://www.nist.gov/tpo/federal-laboratory-interagency-technology-transfer-
summary-reports 
10. An invention disclosure is generally an agreement between the federal agency or one of 
its laboratories and an employed scientist or researcher regarding the ownership of the 
invention. Generally, a scientist or a researcher completes an invention disclosure 
through the agency’s or laboratory’s technology transfer office as a first step for the 
office to consider patenting the invention. See Bradley, Hayter, and Link (2013) on 
disclosures at universities. 
11. Of course, not all R&D-based knowledge manifests itself in new patent applications; 
such new knowledge can manifest itself in terms of publications or even, in the case of 
small entrepreneurial firms, in terms of internal secrets (Hayter and Link 2018). 
12. More generally, the production function for patent applications may be unknown, so that 
estimating equations such as (3) and (4) cannot be derived. In this case, it may be of 
interest to estimate a semi- or non-parametric regression model for patent applications. 
This would likely require a larger sample size. In this paper we therefore maintain the 
conventional parametric framework. 
13. While we use a time series of patent application data for a single unit (agency), much of 
the empirical literature on patenting activity is based on analyses of panel data sets. With 
a panel, one could use the Poisson fixed or random effects estimator of Hausman, Hall, 
and Griliches (1984). Cincera (1997) and Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer (2002) 
discuss panel data estimators that relax some of the parametric assumptions underlying 
the Poisson and negative binomial models. More recently, Charlot, Crescenzi, and 
Musolesi (2015) have proposed a semi-parametric generalized additive model to analyze 
regional knowledge production functions in Europe. 
14. This test is equivalent to a t-test in a regression of the residuals on lagged residuals and 
covariates. See, for example, Godfrey (1988) and White (1992). 
15. Our elasticity estimate is about four times of that presented by Czarnitzki, Kraft, and 
Thorwarth (2009, 142), using a model similar to that in equation (2), but without 
disclosures (D), for a sample of private sector Flemish firms. 
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